

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EAE-00 SSO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15

MC-02 L-03 INRE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00

ACDA-07 EUR-12 NSCE-00 SAM-01 SAJ-01 PRS-01 /070 W

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O 271116Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2497

INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA JAPAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TOKYO 14425

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: MARR, JA

SUBJECT: MIG-25

REF: A. STATE 239432, B. TOKYO 14315

SUMMARY: PREOCCUPATION WITH DIET INTERPELLATION ON HIS POLICY SPEECH AND CONCERN ABOUT ADVERSE REPERCUSSION OF CHARGES OF US PRESSURE THAT WOULD RESULT FROM INEVITABLE PUBLICITY OF CALL ON PRIMIN MIKI AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME HAVE MADE DIRECT ACCESS TO MIKI EXTREMELY AWKWARD. I CONVEYED DEPARTMENT'S CONCERN TO HIM THROUGH VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SATO THIS EVENING. ON BASIS OF CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL GALLIGAN I URGED ADDITIONAL DIRECT ACCESS TO MIG. SATO WAS SYMPATHETIC AND UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY CONVERSATION TO MIKI TONIGHT. IN INTERIM HE COULD REPORT THAT JOINT JDA-MOFA POSITION HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN COURSE OF DAY TO PERMIT ADDITIONAL ACCESS THROUGH OCTOBER 3, I.E. SEPTEMBER 28 DEADLINE WOULD NOT BE IMPOSED. SATO ALSO SAID KOSAKA WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO TIMETABLE WHEN HE SPOKE WITH GROMYKO. JUST INFORMED THAT MIKI HAS RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO EXTEND DIRECT ACCESS THROUGH OCTOBER 3, BUT NO LONGER. END SUMMARY.

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1. WHEN I ATTEMPTED TO SET UP AN URGENT APPOINTMENT

WITH PRIMIN MIKI UPON RECEIPT OF REFTEL A, I WAS ADVISED BY MOFA, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH PRIMIN'S OFFICE THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE TO SCHEDULE MEETING IN NEXT TWO DAYS WITHOUT PRESS KNOWLEDGE AND THAT PRESS COULD INTERPRET CALL AS US PRESSURE, WHICH COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN MAKING AVAILABLE THE ADDITIONAL TIME WE SEEK. IN ANY EVENT, PRIMIN HAS BEEN FULLY ENGAGED IN INTERPELLATIONS ON LAST WEEK'S DIET POLICY SPEECH AND WILL BE SIMILARLY INVOLVED TOMORROW, SEPTEMBER 28. ACCORDINGLY I MET VICE MINISTER SATO THIS EVENING.

2. INFORMED SATO THAT WE UNDERSTOOD MOFA'S CONCERN THAT A FORMAL OPEN APPROACH TO PRIMIN MIKI IN REGARD TO ACCESS TO MIG-25 WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR GOJ TO RESPOND FAVORABLY; THE IMPORTANT THING WAS, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL EXPLOITATION TIME, WHICH WAS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

3. I INFORMED SATO THAT I HAD HESITATED TO COME TO HIM SIMPLY ASKING FOR MORE TIME AND HAD THEREFORE REQUESTED GENERAL GALLIGAN TO GIVE ME THE BEST ESTIMATE OF HOW MUCH TIME WAS NEEDED FOR ESSENTIAL PRIORITIES. HE HOPED FOR TWO ADDITIONAL WEEKS, I.E., UNTIL OCTOBER 10, TO PERMIT COMPLETION OF MOST ESSENTIAL PRIORITIES. IF THIS COULD BE ARRANGED WE WOULD COOPERATE IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO SPEED AIRCRAFT'S RETURN.

4. VICE MIN SATO SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH JDA OFFICIALS AT NOON AND LATTER HAD INFORMED HIM THEY WISHED AT LEAST UNTIL OCTOBER 3 TO COMPLETE ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS TESTS. I NOTED THAT SOVIETS WERE ALREADY UPSET, AND THAT IF A FEW DAYS MORE WERE NEEDED, MY GOVERNMENT FELT DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET ATTITUDES WOULD BE MARGINAL. I AGAIN URGED THAT WE HAVE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE.

5. SATO SAID SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF PROBLEM; GOJ HAD TO CONSIDER PRESS AND OPPOSITION. NEVERTHELESS KOSAKA IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO OCTOBER
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28 WOULD NOT GO BEYOND COMMITMENT TO RETURN PLANE, WITH DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT IN NEGOTIATIONS IN TOKYO. QUESTION WAS WHETHER INVESTIGATION COULD CONTINUE AFTER TALKS ABOUT MIG RETURN STARTED. JDA FELT THIS WAS DIFFICULT. I URGED, HOWEVER, THAT POSSIBILITY BE CONSIDERED OF CONTINUING TESTS ON COMPONENTS EVEN AFTER PREPARATIONS COMMENCED FOR DISMANTLEMENT AND RETURN.

6. SATO UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY MY CONVERSATION TO
PRIMIN TONIGHT AND AFTER THIS DISCUSSION SAID HE COULD
TELL ME THAT DEADLINE OF MIDNIGHT SEPTEMBER 28 REPORTED
REFTEL B WAS OFF AND WE COULD BE ASSURED OF FULL ACCESS
THROUGH OCTOBER 3. JDA STILL TALKED ABOUT TAKING 16 DAYS.
TO PREPARE AIRCRAFT FOR SHIPMENT, HOWEVER, AND HE HOPED
US WOULD HELP ACCELERATE THIS PHASE; I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD
DO WHATEVER WE COULD.
HODGSON

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